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RECENT LEGISLATION 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CML RIGHTS-RECENT NEW YORK CITY OR-
DINANCE BANS DISCRIMINATION IN CERTAIN PRIVATE HOUSING FACILITIES 
-A recent New York City ordinance is the first anti-discrimination legisla-
tion affecting the sale and rental of privately-owned housing to minority 
groups. The ordinance contains three principal provisions: It (I) forbids 
racial or religious discrimination by private owners in the selection of 
tenants or buyers for any "housing accommodation which is located in 
a multiple dwelling,"1 (2) bans discrimination in the selection of purchasers 
by a seller of ten or more contiguous housing units, and (3) prohibits 
the owner or lessor of housing accommodations covered by the ordinance 
from discriminating because of race or religion in setting the terms of 
sale or rental, or in furnishing facilities or services to his renters or buyers. 
The ordinance does not contain any criminal penalties for violations of 
these provisions, but it does provide for administrative enforcement by 
"conciliation" and injunction proceedings in the courts when the normal 
procedure fails.2 New York Local Law 80 of 1957, New York City Ad-
ministrative Code (1957) c. 41, tit. X. 
1 The term "multiple dwelling'' used in the ordinance is defined as any dwelling 
which is occupied as the residence of three or more families, 35(A) N.Y. Consol. Laws 
(McKinney, 1946) §4(7). This statutory definition was made part of the ordinance and 
includes such facilities as rooming houses, hotels, and college dormitories. 
2 The enforcement procedure established by the ordinance starts with the initial 
complaints of discrimination being taken before a city commission. This commission 
investigates the complaints, and if it finds that there has been discrimination it attempts 
to conciliate the matter with the offender. If conciliation fails to stop the discriminatory 
practice the case is passed to another administrative panel for review. If this panel believes 
court action necessary to enforce the ordinance it turns the case over to the city attorney 
who then seeks an injunction against the violator. 
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New York has for several years had a statute prohibiting discrimination 
in privately-owned housing projects which have been given public financial 
assistance.3 A recent New York decision has upheld the constitutionality 
of that statute against objections by an owner of publicly-financed :P.ousing 
that it deprived him of the unrestricted use of his property without due 
process of law under the New York Constitution.4 The New York City 
ordinance is similar in design to that statute and would undoubtedly be 
upheld in New York against any due process objections. Such statutes and 
ordinances are also specifically authorized under the liberal provisions of the 
New York Constitution unless they are patently arbitrary.5 
State statutes have traditionally prohibited the owners of quasi-public 
businesses, such as theaters, restaurants, and public conveyances, from 
racial discrimination in serving the public.6 These statutes have been re0 
peatedly upheld under the Federal Constitution as a valid exercise of the 
states' police powers to regulate the use of private property, on the theory 
that these types of businesses are affected with the public interest because 
the owners hold them out as places of public accommodation.7 More recent 
state anti-discrimination statutes have gone beyond regulation of places of 
public accommodation by prohibiting private discrimination in employ-
ment,8 publicly assisted housing,9 and other areas.10 The state courts have 
apparently assumed that these new anti-discrimination statutes do not 
violate federal due process,11 and there is some analogous Supreme Court 
s 8 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1957) §18(a). 
4 New York State Commission Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, 
170 N.Y.S. (2d) 750 (1958). The court upheld the statute on a broad interpretation of the 
police power, rather than on the particular power of the legislature to regulate individ-
uals who have been given public assistance. The police power theory would apply with 
equal force to the New York City ordinance. 
5 N.Y. CONST., Art. I, §11, provides that no person shall be subjected to discrimina-
tion by another individual or corporation. The New York courts have held this section 
to be :merely declaratory of the state's policy, pence requiring legislative action for 
implementation. See Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. (2d) 541 
(1949). It is clear, however, that this section does give the legislature extremely wide 
discretion to enact anti-discrimination legislation. See Kemp v. Rubin, 188 Misc. 310, 
69 N.Y.S. (2d) 680 (1947). 
6 8 N.Y. Consol. Laws (MoKinney, 1948) §40-b; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§750.146, 
750.147. 
7Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 US. 28 (1948); Western Turf Assn. v. 
Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907); People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245 (1888). See 
generally 49 A.L.R. 505 (1927). 
818 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1951) §§290-298; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1940; Supp. 
1957) §§18:25-4, 18:25-5, 18:25-12. 
9 8 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1957) §IS(a); N.J. Stat. Ann. (1940; Supp. 
1957) §§18:25-9.1, 55:14E-7.1. 
10 Such as exclusion from labor unions, N.J. Stat. Ann. (1940; Supp. 1957) §18:25-6. 
For a survey of the federal government's more limited activities in combating private 
discrimination, see Pasley, "The Nondiscrimination Clause in Government Contracts," 
43 VA. L. R.Ev. 837 (1957). 
11 Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E. (2d) 581 (1954). See generally 44 A.L.R. 
(2d) 1138 (1955) for a dis<;nssion of the constitutionality of fair employment practices laws. 
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authority supporting this assumption.12 Furthermore, these statutes can be 
justified on the basis that they regulate businesses having such important 
relationships to the community's life that they are affected with a public 
interest. The New York ordinance might well be sustained under this 
theory on the hypothesis that multiple dwellings in New York City have 
become quasi-public businesses which can be regulated under the police 
power. On ·the other hand, the police power may now be broad enough 
to reach any phase of economic activity.13 The latter theory might raise 
a question as to what limitation the courts may place on state anti-dis-
crimination statutes. If state police powers reach all economic transactions, 
future statutes could constitutionally prohibit discrimination in the sale 
of a single house by a private owner. A further possibility is that anti-
discrimination legislation will expand into the area of purely social regula-
tion, and prohibit private discrimination in such matters as membership 
in private clubs. This would seem to be an infringement of liberty under 
the due process clause, and would also seem to be beyond the present 
scope of the police power. The school desegregation cases were, however, 
predicated on the theory that segregation by the state denies equal protec-
tion because, of the psychological impact of segregation on minority 
groups.14 Therefore, it could be argued by analogy that the psychological 
impact of private discrimination is detrimental to the public welfare; 
hence, social anti-discrimination legislation is within the scope of the 
police power. Anti-discrimination legislation aimed at purely social rela-
tionships, however, would probably violate the due process clause for 
two reasons. First, while anti-discrimination legislation which deals with 
economic relationships can be justified by the modem concept of the 
police power, legislation which deals with purely social relationships is 
not normally within the scope of the police power. Secondly, social anti-
discrimination legislation would tend to infringe individual liberty rather 
than property rights, and the court has shown a tendency to give liberty 
greater protection from state regulation than property. 
The New York ordinance in its present form clearly appears to be 
constitutional either by reference to the public business aspects of multiple 
dwellings, or by analogy to the broad scope of the police power to regulate 
most phases of economic activity. There is, also, a real possibility that 
12 Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945), upheld a New York statute 
prohibiting membership discrimination by labor unions. The decision makes it clear 
that the states can ban private discrimination in such vital economic areas as labor unions. 
13 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), is the leading case on the modern concept 
of the police power as encompassing most facets of the economy. Under this concept it 
can be argued that anti-discrimination laws which deal with any important aspect of 
the economy are within the scope of the police power under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See New York State Commission Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, note 
4 supra. 
14 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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this ordinance will serve as a pattern for municipal legislation in the 
future.15 Were a state court to strike down such legislation under the 
state constitution, an interesting "state action" problem would be raised 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer16 merely held that 
state court enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant involved action 
by the state in violation of the equal protection clause. In a later case 
the Court divided four-to-four, however, on the question whether a state 
court's refusal to grant a plaintiff relief from discrimination by private 
individuals was "state action,"17 and ·the question apparently remains 
open.18 The question raised here is similar: whether state court invalida-
tion of an anti-discrimination law forbidding private discrimination in-
volves "state action," since such private discrimination would be legally 
possible only after the state, through its courts, struck down the statute. 
One formalistic answer might be that an unconstitutional statute is a 
nullity, and that the court did not act at all but merely recognized what 
had always been true-that no statute preventing discrimination was ever 
in effect.19 Another might be that judicial withdrawal of rights. which 
the legislature gave only in its discretion simply restores the pre-statute 
status quo when clearly no constitutional proscriptions applied. On the 
other hand, however, except for constitutional limitations, legal rights 
exist only at the sufferance of the state.20 Therefore, in one sense a state 
court's constitutional determination that the state cannot prevent private 
discrimination is as much a state policy determination in support of 
private discrimination as ·that found to be "state action" in Shelley v. 
Kraemer. At any rate, if this New York statute is widely copied in less 
liberal jurisdictions, the question ultimately may have to be faced. 
W. Stanley Walch 
15 The National Committee Against Discrimination In Housing, TRENDS IN HOUSING, 
Jan. 1958, p. 2, reports that at least seven cities are already actively considering proposed 
legislation similar to the New York ordinance. 
16 334 U.S. l (1948). 
17 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954). On rehearing, 
349 U.S. 70 (1955), the petition for certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted since 
a subsequent Iowa statute had mooted the issue as to all except petitioner. In this case 
a cemetery refused to ,bury petitioner's deceased husband, solely because he was an Indian. 
The state court refused to disturb this discriminatory status quo. In Shelly v. Kraemer 
the state court affirmatively carried out the discrimination by enforcing the restrictive 
covenant. 
18 But cf. Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956), noted in 55 MICH. L. REv. 
871 (1957). 
19 The argument that an unconstitutional statute is a complete nullity is usually 
made in connection with an attempted amendment. See the discussion of the cases in 
Crawford, "The Legislative Status of an Unconstitutional Statute," 49 MICH. L. REv. 
645 (1951). Whether it could be used in this context is arguable. 
20 But cf. the argument of Justice Harlan which was rejected in the Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 at 13, 41 (1883). Natural law arguments contrary to the proposition 
stated in the text exist, of course. 
